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*Cov. L.J. 42  Introduction  
One of the authors of this short article wrote some time ago that ‘given the reforms made 
by the Land Registration Act 2002 in respect of adverse possession, it is unlikely that the 
deprivation of ownership in circumstances where the owner of the land is given the 
opportunity to object to the adverse possession will be seen as violating the provision of 
article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’1 This is because the 
new law, although allowing the squatter to apply to be registered as owner of the 
dispossessed land after 10 years of continued possession, requires the registered owner to 
be given an opportunity to claim his land back. The registered proprietor has two years in 
which to regularize his possession of the land by evicting the squatter. Where the 
registered owner fails to exercise his right to evict the squatter, the squatter's subsequent 
claim to the land is not disproportionate and therefore not a violation of article 1, Protocol 
1. Prior to the Land Registration Act 2002 a registered owner's title could simply be 
extinguished after 12 years of sustained possession by the squatter. There was no 
mechanism to alert the registered owner to the fact that his title to land may be 
automatically extinguished after the 12-year period. 
In the post-human rights era it was inevitable that the question would arise as to whether 
such automatic and arbitrary termination of the registered owner's title was contrary to the 
article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention. The matter fell to be decided in J.A. Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom2 where the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
automatic termination of a registered owner's title after 12 years possession was indeed a 
violation of article 1, Protocol 1. The decision of the Court did question some of the 
established principles of English land law, particularly, the relevance of possession in the 
common law tradition and principle of relativity of title. More recently the decision of the 
European Court has been overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights where it was has held that a squatter's right to another persons land are not 
disproportionate. This short piece examines the decision of the Grand Chamber and 
welcomes it on the grounds that it gives recognition to some of the fundamental and long 
established principles of English land law. 
 *Cov. L.J. 43  The Facts  
The applicants were two United Kingdom companies, J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye 
(Oxford) Land Ltd. The applicants were the registered owners of agricultural land, title to 
which they had lost in the English courts through a successful claim to adverse possession. 
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The claim was made by the personal representative of the late Michael Graham along with 
Caroline Graham (hereafter the Grahams) who had claimed rights to 25 hectares of 
agricultural land belonging to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd ( hereafter Pye). The action was 
commenced by J.A Pye (Oxford) Ltd against the United Kingdom government on the basis 
that it should be compensated by the government on the grounds that the latter had failed 
to ensure that legislation was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Particularly, that the combined effect of the Land Registration Act and the Limitation Act 
1980 was to deprive them of their rights under the Convention without compensation. 
In the English courts, the Grahams based their argument on s.15 of the Limitation Act 
1980, which provides that no action shall be brought by a landowner to recover his land 
after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him. 
Schedule 1, paragraph 1 provides that the right of action to recover land is deemed to have 
accrued to the landowner when the land owner has been either dispossessed of his land or 
has discontinued use of his land. Dispossession usually refers to an ouster by the squatter, 
for example, where the squatter has fenced in land belonging to the paper owner and has 
since then not allowed the paper owner to enter on the land. The Grahams argued that 
since 1984 they had taken possession of the land belonging to Pye and as a result they had 
established a successful claim of adverse possession. Pye counter-argued that the land had 
at all times belonged to them and that they had an intention to build on the land. More 
importantly, however, they argued that the Grahams had at no time dispossessed them of 
the land. This is because firstly, in 1983, the Grahams had entered into an agreement with 
Pye to use the land until 31 December 1983, for the payment of a sum of £2000. Secondly, 
when that agreement expired, the Grahams continued to use the land; their use of it was 
not inconsistent with the paper title of Pye, because they were willing to pay for the use of 
land and as such were not acting as owners of it. After 1986 Pye did very little in connection 
with the disputed land. Pye brought proceedings in the English courts in 1998 to recover 
the land. In order to understand *Cov. L.J. 44  the decision of the Grand Chamber, it is 
important to revisit the developments that took place in the English courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 The Decisions of the English Courts  
At first instance the judge held that the Grahams had established a successful possessory 
title to Pye's land and that time began to run against Pye in 1984 after the expiration of the 
licence agreement.3 The Court of Appeal reversed this finding and held that no successful 
adverse possession claim could be found simply because the Grahams had not 
dispossessed Pye from the land.4 One of the main arguments in the case was that, even 
though Pye had done very little in the period between 1986 and 1998, they were still within 
the limitation period to claim the land back. In relation to the period between 1984 and 
1986, the Court of Appeal held that there could be no finding of dispossession simply 
because the Grahams were using the land in the hope that a new licence agreement might 
be forthcoming. This subjective intention was held to be crucial by the Court of Appeal 
because it was indicative of a form of implied licence by Pye that the Grahams could use the 
land. The decision of the Court of Appeal begged the question whether a successful claim to 
adverse possession rested on the subjective intentions of both the squatter and the paper 
owner or whether on the objective intention to possess land for the requisite period of time 
required by the Limitation Act 1980? Furthermore, were subjective factors such as the 
willingness of the squatter to pay for the use of land and his subjective belief that he was 
not the owner relevant? These matters fell to be decided by the House of Lords. 
The leading judgment in the House of Lords was delivered by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who 
explained that the matter was simply one of whether the adverse possessor had 
dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the land without his 
consent.5 In so far as the requisite acts needed for possession, his Lordship explained that 
this required two elements. Firstly, a sufficient degree of physical custody and control, 
which requires factual possession. Secondly, an intention to exercise such custody and 
control for his own benefit. In so far as a need to have an intention to own, his Lordship 
referred to the words of Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council v. Moran6 who said that 
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what was required was ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership 
but an intention to *Cov. L.J. 45  possess.’7 On the basis of these principles, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson explained that the Grahams had established a satisfactory possessory 
title to the land belonging to Pye. Furthermore, their willingness to pay for the occupation 
of the land did not matter providing that they had the necessary possession at all times. 
Their willingness to pay did not alter the fact that they had the necessary factual 
possession for the period of time prescribed by the Limitation Act 1980. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that whilst the statutory provisions founded in the 
Limitation Act 1980 were relatively straightforward, much of the confusion in this area of 
the law had been caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Leigh v. Jack.8 In this 
case Bramwell LJ held that for a successful claim of adverse possession ‘…acts must be 
done which are inconsistent with the enjoyment of the soil for the purpose for which [the 
true owner] intended to use it.’9 According to this so called ‘implied licence theory;’ there 
could be no claim to adverse possession if the squatter merely possessed the land without 
interfering with the future intentions of the real owner. It mattered not how much intention 
and how much control the squatter had exerted to the disputed land. Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, however, explained that the line of reasoning in Leigh v. Jack had been 
rejected by the Court of Appeal in Buckingham County Council v. Moran.10 After approving 
of the principles set out by Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council v. Moran, his Lordship 
went on to explain the concepts of possession, dispossession and adverse possession. In so 
far as the concept of possession is concerned, his Lordship explained that it was to be given 
its traditional meaning, which simply meant ‘that degree of occupation or physical control, 
coupled with the requisite intention commonly known as animus possidendi, that would 
entitle a person to maintain an action for trespass in relation to the relevant land’.11 
Moving on to the meaning of dispossession, his Lordship gave a simplistic meaning to the 
word, explaining that it simply meant the taking of possession from another without the 
other's consent.12 
The decision of the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham did not only reaffirm 
the importance of possession in the common law tradition as had been understood 
historically, but it also explained that it was long sustained possession that is the root of a 
successful claim to adverse possession. It does not matter that the adverse possessor does 
not have an actual subjective belief that he is acting as *Cov. L.J. 46  the owner.13 
Neither does it matter that the possessor is willing to pay for the occupation of the land, 
providing that there is possession which is inconsistent with the paper owner's title.14 
Much of the confusion in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham arose from the decision of 
Bramwell LJ in Leigh v. Jack15 where his Lordship explained that possession of the paper 
owner could not be disturbed by a squatter if the paper owner could show a future intention 
to use the land. This so-called ‘implied licence theory’ meant that the squatter's 
possession, no matter how strong and continuous, could not disturb the paper owner's 
title. However, having been rejected by the Court of Appeal in Buckinghamshire County 
Council v. Moran, this rule no longer applied and was not relevant to the case of Pye v 
Graham.16 
 Adverse Possession, Human Rights and Article 1 of the European 
Convention.  
In the post-Human Rights Act era the question has arisen whether the deprivation of 
ownership without compensation of land through the principles of adverse possession is in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Put quite simply, is the cumulative 
effect of the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of claims for the recovery of land and the 
consequential denial of the right to claim land after 12 years a deprivation of a person's 
property contrary to article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention? Section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 imposes a duty on a domestic court to read and give effect to primary and 
subordinate legislation in a manner which is compatible with the Convention. Article 1, 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
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conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law.’ 
The loss of ownership without compensation through adverse possession falls quite neatly 
into the second rule of article 1, Protocol 1. In the words of one leading commentator, ‘that 
an owner can be effectively deprived of his or her land without the payment of 
compensation and without due legal process raises the question as to the compatibility of 
s.15 of the Limitation Act 1980 with Article 1, Protocol 1.17 If it is *Cov. L.J. 
47  incompatible, the impact of possession as a means of extinguishing a former title in 
land and creating a new one as discussed in this article is reduced to a meaningless 
concept. 
The question of whether s.15 of the Limitation Act 1980 and the consequential denial of 
ownership through adverse possession was compatible with the Human Rights Act was 
considered by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham.18 
In the High Court Neuberger J, although coming to the conclusion that the Grahams has 
established a successful claim to adverse possession of land, was nevertheless sympathetic 
to the human rights arguments presented on behalf of Pye. In the course of his judgment, 
Neuberger J commented that ‘the result is disproportionate, because, particularly in a 
climate of increasing awareness of human rights, including the right to enjoy one's own 
property, it does seem draconian to the owner, and a windfall for the squatter, that the 
owner should lose 57 acres of land to the squatter with no compensation whatsoever.’19 
The Court of Appeal, however, took a rather different approach to the compatibility of the 
Limitation Act 1980 with the protection of property guaranteed in the Convention. 
Mummery LJ was of the opinion that the Limitation Act 1980, in particular s.15, which 
provides that no right of action to recover land shall be bought after 12 years after the right 
of action accrued to the legal owner, was not incompatible with the protection afforded in 
article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention. His Lordship explained that the effect of s.15 was 
not to deprive the legal owner of land, his possessions or the peaceful enjoyment of them, 
rather the effect of the Act was to deny access to the courts for a remedy recovering the 
land. In his Lordship's words, ‘…the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act…do not deprive a 
person of his possessions or interfere with his peaceful enjoyment of them. They deprive 
him of his right to access the courts for the purpose of recovering property if he has delayed 
the institution of legal proceedings for 12 years or more…’20 
It is not altogether clear whether the distinction between a deprivation of property and a 
deprivation of a right to bring an action for the recovery of property is a satisfactory one in 
the context of property rights. One of the crucial incidents of a person's ownership of a 
thing is the right to be put in possession of it and remain in *Cov. L.J. 48  possession if he 
so chooses.21 An equally important incident of ownership is the right to security, which 
involves an expectation on behalf of the owner that he will remain the owner indefinitely if 
he so chooses. This expectation amounts to immunity from expropriation except where 
just compensation is given to the legal owner. In this respect, the right to commence an 
action for the recovery of property is a central ingredient of a person's ownership. The 
deprivation of a person's right to commence an action to recover his property is a 
deprivation of one of the very basic ingredients of his ownership. The matter is explained 
by one commentator who writes, ‘is the ability to commence court proceedings to recover 
property from a trespasser a fundamental characteristic of property ownership? If it is, the 
loss of the right to commence court action impinges upon the very nature of property 
ownership and cannot be artificially dissected from it and treated as separate from it.’22 
Whilst the matter in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham was referred to the European Court of 
Human Rights the English courts had the opportunity to examine whether the law of 
adverse possession was contrary to the article 1, Protocol 1. In Beaulane Properties Ltd v 
Palmer23 Deputy Judge Strauss QC held that the effect of s17 of the Limitation Act 1980 
was to deprive the registered owner of land of all of his right to it. As a result of this, he was 
clearly of the view that such a deprivation was in violation of the rights under the 
Convention. The judge did, however, go on to say that the new law of adverse possession 
founded in the Land Registration Act 2002 did not produce a disproportionate result and 
therefore was not contrary to the principles of the Convention. 
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 The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights  
The opportunity to examine whether the law of adverse possession was incompatible with 
the provisions of the European Convention fell to be decided by the European Court in J.A. 
Pye (Oxford) Ltd United Kingdom.24 The action was commenced by J.A Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
against the United Kingdom Government on the basis that it should be compensated by the 
government on the grounds that it was the latter's failure to *Cov. L.J. 49  ensure that 
legislation was in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
European Court of Human Rights held that the rights of J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd had been 
violated and they were entitled to compensation. The United Kingdom Government had put 
the value of the land at £2.5 million. J.A Pye (Oxford) Ltd disputed this and put the value of 
the land nearer the region of £10 million. In coming to its conclusion, the European Court 
considered a number of questions. Firstly, the Court considered whether the law of adverse 
possession in England amounted to an interference with the applicant's rights under the 
Convention. The Court held that the combined effect of the Land Registration Act 1925 and 
the Limitation Act 1980 was to deprive the applicants of their right to peaceful enjoyment 
of their property and was therefore contrary to article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention. The 
Court explained that under article 1, deprivation of peaceful enjoyment could only be 
justified on the grounds of public interest and the question was whether the law of adverse 
possession could be justified in such a way. The Court explained that the national 
authorities were better placed to decide what was in the public interest. The Court noted 
that the law of adverse possession had been retained by the Land Registration Act 2002 
and this was proof that the United Kingdom Parliament deemed the law of adverse 
possession to be in the public interest.25 
The Court then addressed the question as to whether the law of adverse possession 
produced a disproportionate result. The Court explained that this matter could only be 
answered by weighing the interests of the registered owner against the general public 
interest. The United Kingdom government counter-argued that the law of adverse 
possession pursued a legitimate objective and was proportionate to any interference with 
any property rights. In particular, the government pointed out that the law of adverse 
possession had been established for a long time and that the registered owners were fully 
aware that they ran the risk that their title would be extinguished. Furthermore, the 
government argued that the law of adverse possession did not violate article 1, Protocol 1 
because the matter was simply one of a limitation period rather than a taking of property. 
These arguments were rejected by the court, which concluded that the net effect of the law 
was to produce a very harsh result on the registered owner of the land that lost title by 
adverse possession. This, therefore, meant that the law produced a disproportionate result 
and violated the principles under the Convention. 
 *Cov. L.J. 50  The Decision of the Grand Chamber  
After the Court's Chamber judgement, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, under 
Article 43(2) of the Convention and Rule 73 of the Rules of the Court at the request of the 
United Kingdom Government. The Grand Chamber delivered its judgement on 30 
August.26 The Grand Chamber overturned the Chamber's decision by 10 votes to 7 and 
confirmed that the balance of interests required under article 1 of the Protocol was not 
upset and that the Grahams had not violated the companies' rights to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions. 
The basis of the argument from Pye now centred on three main issues: firstly, that there 
was no justification for them to lose their right of ownership of registered land; secondly, 
that there was no justification that could justify depriving them of their land without 
compensation; thirdly that there was no justification in depriving them of their land without 
procedural protection that would allow them the opportunity to respond to any such claims. 
In addition, in support of their case, Pye argued that in many other European states the 
limitation period was often considerably longer than the 12 years applicable in their case 
and many other jurisdictions required additional criteria to be satisfied, for example, a 
notion of good faith. 
In response, the United Kingdom government also put forward three distinct arguments for 
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the Chamber's consideration. They argued that the case should have been brought under 
article 6 and not article 1 of the Protocol since the limitation period effectively denied a 
claimant a means of enforcing his or her rights at the end of the statutory period. In any 
event the United Kingdom Government had not deprived Pye of their land by appropriating 
it for their own use but that ‘the outcome of the proceedings was dictated by the applicant 
companies' own inaction.’27 In relation to Pye's claim for compensation, therefore, they 
argued that this should be addressed under article 6. Article 1 was not appropriate; why 
should the Government have to look after the applicant company when they have found 
themselves in this position through their own inaction? 
The United Kingdom Government also considered that the Chamber should, when 
considering the Government's position, take into account that land was a limited *Cov. 
L.J. 51  resource and therefore the emphasis in relation to land should be that it be ‘used, 
maintained and improved.’ This implied that a finite time limit for recovery of land would 
encourage landowners to make use of their land. 
Whilst Pye argued that the domestic law relating to adverse possession was out of line with 
other European states, the Government in response, put forward to the Chamber that 
there was no European ‘norm’; that the limitation periods differed; and that in some States 
good faith was irrelevant whilst others took it into account together with a substantial 
number of other factors. In coming to its decision, the Grand Chamber considered the 
representations given by the parties, as well as the earlier decisions in the domestic courts 
and the lower Chamber; and, in its judgment, responded to each of the arguments put 
forward and separated out its response to deal with each of the issues. On the point of 
whether the matter should be dealt with under article 1 of Protocol 1, the Grand Chamber 
concluded that article 1 was applicable stating clearly that ‘there was nothing in principle to 
preclude the examination of a claim under article 1 of Protocol 1 where the complaint is 
directed against legislation concerning property rights.’28 Accordingly, the relevant 
legislation -the 1925 Law of Property Act and the 1980 Limitation Act- was part of the 
general land law created by the United Kingdom Government that regulated the use of land 
ownership between individuals. 
After establishing the relevance of article 1 of Protocol 1, the Grand Chamber then came to 
the conclusion that the relevant domestic legislation - in particular the Limitation Act 1980 
- was effectively a means of regulating title rather than depriving a paper owner of title. 
The law, therefore, did not deprive a person of his possessions as defined under the first 
paragraph of article 1; but the legislation was there as a means of ensuring that there was 
an ultimate control of the use of land. Indeed, the judges noted, that the domestic courts 
in the earlier decisions had considered that the extinguishment of title at the end of an 
action of adverse possession was a ‘logical and pragmatic consequence.’29 Furthermore, 
Pye had never argued that the conclusions of the domestic courts on this point were 
unreasonable or unforeseeable in the light of the legislation. Indeed, both parties had used 
examples from other European States that had incorporated similar concepts of the 
limitation period in relation to adverse possession of land. In response the Grand Chamber 
agreed that *Cov. L.J. 52  the comparative material provided by both sides had shown 
that other European Union States had a similar mechanism of transferring titles using the 
mechanism of adverse possession (also without payment of compensation to the original 
owners). 
Accordingly, the Grand Chamber concluded that the case before them fell within the 
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 1 Protocol 1 namely: 
“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
Having decided that the case, therefore, came within this second paragraph of article 1, it 
was then for the Grand Chamber to decide whether or not there existed a ‘reasonable 
relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.’30 In other 
words, was there a fair balance between this general interest in imposing a limitation 
period and the subsequent extinguishment of title and the interests of the original 
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individual landowners themselves? 
In coming to its decision, when weighing up the ‘fair balance’ argument, the Grand 
Chamber noted on more than one occasion that very little action was required by Pye to 
stop time running (for example, by asking for rent, commencing an action for recovery) 
and, in addition, the relevant legislation had been in force many years prior to the 
extinguishment of title in this case. It should also be noted that during the relevant period 
the ownership of the property ‘technically’ changed, giving the opportunity of questions of 
any potential overriding interests to be raised, even when the parties involved may be 
associated companies. 
The Grand Chamber concluded that the fair balance had not been upset. There was 
effectively no violation of article 1 of Protocol 1 in that the English law on adverse 
possession as a means of control on the use of land (acknowledging at the same time that 
land was a scarce resource) was proportionate. Pye had argued that the loss of the land 
was so great and the windfall to the Grahams so significant that, in this case, the balance 
had been upset. The Grand Chamber, nevertheless, took a clear objective stance (in 
comparison to some of the earlier decisions in the case, *Cov. L.J. 53  perhaps) by 
directing that if the limitation periods were to achieve their purpose they had to apply 
regardless of the size of the claim 
In response, therefore, to Pye's claim for compensation, which was the fundamental aim of 
the case being brought to the European Courts, the Grand Chamber sided with the United 
Kingdom Government. It noted that ‘the requirement of compensation by a party who fails 
to observe the limitation period sits uneasily alongside the concept of limitation periods and 
thereby legal certainty.’31 To further emphasise the point the General Chamber referred to 
the Land Registration Act 2002 where no compensation is payable under these provisions 
by any person who becomes the registered owner following a successful application for 
registration. 
 Commentary and conclusions  
The decision of the Grand Chamber is to be welcomed on a number of grounds. The law of 
adverse possession in England is deeply rooted in some of the fundamental principles of 
land law. The common law tradition in respect of ownership of land often turns more to the 
question of fact than right; in particular, the fact of sustained possession.32 One leading 
commentator writes, ‘the pre-eminent position accorded to de facto possession in English 
law ensures that there is no such thing as absolute title to land. All title is ultimately 
relative: the title of the present possessor will customarily be upheld unless and until a 
better claim is advanced on behalf of somebody else.’33 Although the Land Registration Act 
2002 fundamentally alters the way in which a claim to adverse possession can be made, 
the fact remains that sustained possession gives a right to challenge the title of the 
registered owner. 
In addition to the legal justifications for original acquisition through adverse possession of 
land, there are important social and economic justifications for the rules. Certainty of title 
is one of the important social objectives behind rules of adverse possession.34 If claims to 
land that are based on long possession are *Cov. L.J. 54  nevertheless allowed to be 
defeated by others showing that they were the owner some time in the past, it is inevitable 
that title to land becomes uncertain. Such titles are not conducive to a liberal market 
engaged in exchange and bargain. The basic premise must be that long, unchallenged 
possession of land should not be disturbed. Although some sort of wrongful possession of 
land should be disallowed, the Limitation Act operated in an arbitrary way in providing a cut 
off point when the true owner could not challenge the title of another possessor of the land 
to which the original title pertained. The resulting uncertainty over title has an impact not 
only on the person who has been in possession of the land, but also on third parties such as 
purchasers and mortgagees who may have interests in the land. In other words, title in real 
property law must be seen as operating in a multitude of transactions concerning the same 
piece of land. Uncertainty over title is undesirable because the effects are far-reaching and 
they affect more than one transaction. It is only on reliance of title that some of these 
transactions are entered into; therefore subsequent uncertainty is a bad thing. In this 
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sense the law of adverse possession pursues a legitimate objective and is proportional to it. 
It is interesting to note that that the Grand Chamber in the course of its judgment appears 
to acknowledge that a domestic state should be given leeway in interpreting paragraph 2 of 
article 1 and any consequential legislation. As specifically stated by the Grand Chamber in 
its judgment: 
“States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regards both to choosing the means of 
enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified 
for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.” 
The relevant provisions of the Land Registration Act 2002 relating to adverse possession 
were largely in response to government and judicial fears of the applicability of article 1 on 
domestic decisions. It would be interesting to speculate whether, had the Grand Chamber 
issued this decision prior to the drafting of the Land Registration Act 2002, its provisions 
would have swung so much in favour of property owners ‘seeking protection from the 
government against the consequences of their own inattention?’35 
 Deputy Head of Law, Coventry University 
 Senior Lecturer in Law, Coventry University 
Cov. L.J. 2007, 12(2), 41-54 
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